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The Reversal of the Passfield White Paper, 1930-31: A Reassessment 
 
When the Balfour Declaration of 1917 pledged British support for the creation 
of a Jewish national home in Palestine, the British Empire began an official 
relationship with Zionism, but one that became more challenging as the decades 
progressed. Britain officially secured the internationally sanctioned mandate for 
Palestine in 1922, but two periods of riots and violence had already led to limits on 
the British-Zionist relationship. The Churchill White Paper of 1922 sought to both 
affirm and limit the Jewish national home, assuring detractors that the Jews were in 
Palestine ‘of right and not on the sufferance’ but that their immigration was tied to 
Palestine’s economic capacity.1 This action coincided with a period of calm in 
Palestine for most of the 1920s, during which British politicians were able to ignore 
lingering Jewish-Arab tensions, leading to rapid reductions in costly troops and 
police, based on the mistaken belief that British policy had ameliorated the conflict. 
However, a new quarrel over Jerusalem’s ‘Wailing Wall’ in 1928 roused the passions 
of all Palestine’s communities, leading to violence on a horrific scale in August 
1929.
2
 The British Government responded with two commissions of inquiry that 
directly resulted in the Passfield White Paper of 1930.  
This document represented the first attempt to limit the Jewish national home, 
not indefinitely, but to an extent designed to prevent rioting in the future. 
Nevertheless, this new policy was reversed. The volte-face was articulated in a letter 
sent from Prime Minister James Ramsay MacDonald to the President of the World 
Zionist Organisation, Chaim Weizmann, in February 1931, giving rise to the belief 
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that Zionist lobbying had successfully harnessed the British Empire. This is a rather 
simplistic assessment, however, and attempting to find the reasons behind Britain’s 
policy change requires looking at the Labour Government’s political pressure points 
in 1930-31 in more depth. Rather than a Palestine policy based on a narrow 
interpretation of the role played by Zionist lobbying, this analysis reveals a Palestine 
policy based primarily on the need to maintain a modicum of unity within government 
and across parties, which was threatened by the strategic pro-Zionist activism of 
opposition leaders. This episode represented a stillborn moment in the development of 
British policy in Palestine, but it has a continued relevance for both Israeli and 
Palestinian historical narratives. 
 
Scholars often assume that the activities of Zionist lobbyists, such as Chaim 
Weizmann, successfully placed the British government under immense pressure to 
recant the Passfield policy. Shlomo Ben-Ami, for example, notes that, ‘before it could 
even come into effect, Passfield’s White Paper was for all practical purposes 
abrogated by Chaim Weizmann’s skilful lobbying’; similarly, Benny Morris writes, 
‘By early 1931 well-applied Zionist pressure in the press and lobbying by Weizmann 
in London bore fruit’.3 The same reasoning is found in Yehoshua Porath’s work, 
citing ‘Zionist pressure’ in the reversal of policy, in Ilan Pappe’s A History of Modern 
Palestine, Neil Caplan’s Contested Histories and many others.4 Such ‘explanations’ 
of British behaviour are almost entirely without citation, however, and when they are 
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referenced, the evidence is tenuous. Susan Pederson, for example, notes that 
‘Historians usually and rightly credit Weizmann’s remonstrance and effective 
lobbying for that volte-face’, and cites Norman Rose’s The Gentile Zionists to 
illustrate this point.
5
 This analysis, however, cannot be found in Rose’s book; instead, 
he offers an account that posits the importance of Parliamentary political infighting 
and at no point credits Weizmann with a victory. 
Rather than Rose’s work, which is based heavily on research at the Weizmann 
Archives, this myth is actually most likely the result of Chaim Weizmann’s own 
account in his autobiography, Trial and Error. In what Christopher Sykes agrees is a 
highly biased account of the negotiations with British politicians, Weizmann paints 
the British attitude as incompetent and coloured by antisemitism.
6
 Accounts of the 
white paper’s reversal are rarely granted more than a sentence or two in histories of 
the mandate or Anglo-Zionist relations, and there seems to have been a widespread 
acceptance of these largely unfounded assumptions.
7
 
A small number of scholars have attempted to provide a more nuanced 
explanation, but the analyses remain unsatisfactory. One argument points to a 
Whitechapel by-election as the reason for Labour’s apparent collapse under pressure.8 
Crucially, however, the by-election took place on 3 December 1930 – two months 
before MacDonald wrote to Weizmann. James Hall – the Labour candidate in 
Whitechapel – won having secured the support of the British chapter of international 
Zionist organisation, Poalei Zion, despite the Liberal candidate actually being Jewish 
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and every other candidate denouncing the white paper.
9
 It is incongruous, therefore, to 
explain the government’s reversal decision by implying that it was a preventative 
measure directed towards this by-election.  
Another opinion about this incident points to a letter to The Times written by 
pre-eminent lawyers Hailsham and Simon. Taking what amounted to a pro-Zionist 
stance, the letter called for an opinion from The Hague on whether limiting Jewish 
immigration violated the mandate for Palestine.
10
 This argument cites Prime Minister 
MacDonald’s desire to avoid scrutiny as the reason for reversing Passfield’s white 
paper.
11
 The problem with this reasoning, however, is that Hailsham and Simon 
specifically focused on criticising paragraphs 27 and 28 of the white paper, neither of 
which featured in MacDonald’s letter to Weizmann. If Hailsham and Simon’s 
criticisms were crucial, then why were their arguments absent from the final reversal? 
On its own, the Hailsham and Simon letter provides only a half-formed explanation. 
The letter was important, but for a different reason. Hailsham and Simon were pre-
eminent lawyers, but more importantly, were both former and future cabinet ministers 
from the Conservative and Liberal parties respectively, and their letter to The Times is 
evidence of the political infighting highlighted by Rose, Gabriel Sheffer and later by 
Gudrun Kramer, but as yet not investigated further.
12
 Instead, by addressing why the 
Passfield White Paper was originally published, as well as problems created by 
disunity within the Labour Party and the need for cross-party support on India policy, 
it is possible to reveal the conditions that made James Ramsay MacDonald’s 
government so susceptible to pressure on the Palestine issue.  
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Considering the outrage that followed its publication, it is pertinent to ask why 
the government even approved the Passfield White Paper. In the immediate aftermath 
of violence in Palestine, two commissions of inquiry investigated the root of the 
problem. The first was led by the distinguished jurist, Sir Walter Shaw and the second 
was composed of only one man, Sir John Hope-Simpson. Just as earlier commissions 
investigating violence had concluded in the early 1920s, all but one member of 
Shaw’s team identified that ‘the difficulties inherent in the Balfour Declaration and in 
the Mandate for Palestine are factors of supreme importance in the consideration of 
the Palestine problem’.13 Palestine had suffered severe economic problems during the 
1920s, and despite provisions of the Churchill White Paper of 1922 having stipulated 
that immigration should be based on economic capacity, this had largely been 
ignored. The Shaw Commission found that both immigration and Jewish land 
purchase meant ‘a landless and discontented class is being created’. This was a 
dangerous development, and the commission recommended a radical overhaul of 
agriculture and expansion of cultivation to solve the problem as well as a further 
scientific enquiry to determine the details.
14
 As Sir John Hope-Simpson was 
considered experienced in ethnic conflicts, having acted as the League of Nations’ 
Vice-Chairman of the Refugee Settlement Commission in Greece, and was neither 
demonstrably pro-Arab nor pro-Zionist, he was entrusted with the task.
15
 
After two months of researching scientific reports written during the mandate, 
as well as conducting interviews and travelling the country, Hope-Simpson concluded 
that ‘there is at the present time and with the present methods of Arab cultivation no 
margin of land available for agricultural settlement by new immigrants, with the 
                                                 
13
 WO 32/9614, 1920, Jerusalem riots: Courts of Enquiry, The National Archives, Kew (hereafter 
TNA); Cmd 1540, 1921, Palestine  Disturbances in May, 1921. Reports of the Commission Of Inquiry 
with Correspondence Relating Thereto; Cmd 3530, 150-163. 
14
 Cmd 3530, 161-166. 
15
 CAB 24/212, 9 May 1930, ‘Palestine: Statement with Regard to British Policy’, TNA, 4. 
 6 
exception of such undeveloped land as the Jewish Agencies hold in reserve’. 
Although Hope-Simpson noted that Arab unemployment and landlessness were 
ascribed ‘probably quite erroneously, to Jewish competition’, Palestine’s economic 
woes required ‘drastic action’. Fundamentally, he believed that ‘[w]ithout 
development, there is not room for a single additional settler’.16 In light of these two 
commission reports, the Cabinet Committee on Palestine, led by Colonial Secretary 
Lord Passfield, was faced with the necessity of action. The problem with extensive 
development, however, was the economy. 
The American stock-market crash of 1929 was developing into an 
international financial crisis that heralded stagnation and unemployment for British 
voters, and development in Palestine necessitated either a guaranteed loan or grant-in-
aid from the Colonial Office.
17
 When the Cabinet Committee on Palestine submitted 
their first report on 15 September 1930, it included a detailed plan for the 
development that Hope-Simpson had advised was urgently necessary. However, the 
cost of Hope-Simpson’s plan was unknown until a further financial committee 
delivered the blow: ‘Sir John Hope-Simpson’s scheme involved the expenditure of 
some £6,000,000, spread over ten years, the interest on which would have to be 
guaranteed by the Exchequer. This would probably necessitate a loan spread over 
twenty years, the service of which would require £400,000 a year. This sum, however, 
did not include the capital cost of the land’. These amounts were much higher than 
anything the cabinet committee had considered and they were advised to re-assess the 
situation.
18
 The committee prepared a new report and concluded that, ‘in present 
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circumstances a proposal to spend many millions on land settlement of Jews and 
Arabs in Palestine would, meet with serious opposition in Parliament and the 
country’.19  
Consequently, the committee’s report returned to the cabinet on 24 September 
with new suggestions. They decided that the Jews should be allowed, at their own 
expense, to continue developing the land they already owned and that this should 
suffice to permit Jewish settlement for the following five years. Jewish immigration 
would be restricted to numbers suitable for those reserve lands or could be absorbed 
comfortably into the industrial population.
20
 The outcome was a compromise of some 
very limited development and compensation, as well as limits on the rate of expansion 
of the Jewish national home. The Colonial Secretary warned Weizmann, giving him 
an overview of the Hope-Simpson report and the policy under consideration, and 
Passfield believed that Weizmann ‘took it very well indeed’ while stressing that ‘there 
should be no numerical limitation on the ultimate number of Jews’.21 The draft policy 
was published as the Passfield White Paper on 21 October 1930 and prompted 
condemnation from both the Conservative and Liberal Party leaders.
22
 
By February 1931, the white paper had been undermined so severely as to 
constitute reversal. This was done in the letter from MacDonald to Weizmann 
offering an ‘authoritative interpretation’ of the Passfield White Paper and British 
policy in Palestine. Far from limiting land purchase or Jewish immigration, the 
MacDonald Letter stressed that centralised control over land purchase would be 
‘regulatory and not prohibitive’ and that ‘His Majesty’s Government did not imply a 
prohibition of acquisition of additional land by Jews’, which had been the central 
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 8 
theme of Passfield’s policy. Regarding immigration, the letter assured that ‘His 
Majesty’s government did not prescribe and do not contemplate any stoppage or 
prohibition of Jewish immigration in any of its categories’23, which again, ran counter 
to both the Shaw and Hope-Simpson commission reports as well as the deliberations 
of the Cabinet Committee on Palestine and the approval they received in cabinet. As 
the final text of the letter ‘had been agreed upon between representatives of the Jewish 
Agency and [another] Committee appointed by the Cabinet on the 6th November, 
1930’24, Zionist leaders appeared to have exerted a great deal of influence on the 
decision, contributing to the belief in the power of lobbying.  
However, although Weizmann did orchestrate a campaign by writing letters to 
prominent newspapers as well as the Permanent Mandates Commission and 
encouraging his supporters and friends – of which he had many among the British 
elite – to do the same, these efforts always constituted more of a public show of 
protest than an exercise in secret diplomacy. Negotiations with Zionists from 
November 1930 until January 1931 began with the Foreign Office trying to convince 
Weizmann and his colleagues that the white paper was a sound, legal policy and 
ended with a volte-face. Understanding why this occurred requires a more nuanced 
and cumulative analysis of the state of imperial policy and Parliamentary politics in 
1930-31. 
 
As a minority administration, the second Labour government was intrinsically fragile. 
The Passfield White Paper attracted criticism from many groups and personages, but 
discord it created within the Labour Party itself was more worrying. As Labour’s 
traditional stance towards Zionism had been staunchly supportive, James Ramsay 
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MacDonald’s government faced the threat of a backbench rebellion, highlighting a 
fundamental division between the principles of Labour politicians outside of the 
government and those in cabinet advocating a ruthlessly pragmatic policy for 
Palestine. This disunity, combined with Labour’s numerical weakness in the House of 
Commons and its need for cross-party support on foreign policy, especially with 
regard to India, made the government susceptible to pressure on the Zionism issue. 
Ideologically, Labour had been officially pro-Zionist since shortly before the 
Balfour Declaration, having approved the War Aims Memorandum, which called for 
a Jewish return to Palestine. It was written chiefly by Sydney Webb, who became 
Lord Passfield, and reflected the Party’s general support for self-determination among 
national ethnic groups – including in India.25 By 1930, the strongest Labour 
supporters of Zionism were Joseph Kenworthy in the House of Commons and Josiah 
Wedgewood in the Lords.
26
  
Kenworthy, for example, wrote to Weizmann immediately after the white 
paper’s publication, assuring him he had the support of many non-Jewish MPs and 
would correct this ‘blunder’.27 This preference, however, was buoyed by Kenworthy’s 
general commitment to pragmatism in ethnic conflicts. He did not consider British 
conciliations in the face of violence to be good policy unless they actually solved the 
problem at hand, and his 1931 book called India: A Warning cautioned fellow 
politicians that succumbing to the violence of one particular ethnic group would not 
solve fundamental obstacles to peace and stability.
28
 In the House of Lords, 
Wedgwood had promoted Zionism since the 1920s, joining with both James Ramsay 
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MacDonald and future Chancellor Philip Snowden in organising the Palestine 
Mandate Society, a pro-Zionist lobby group. MacDonald had even visited Palestine in 
1922 and subsequently argued that the Arab claim to self-determination was invalid 
because ‘Palestine and the Jews can never be separated’.29 MacDonald, Passfield and 
Snowden, therefore, had all promoted the Zionist movement with their likeminded 
colleagues before being faced with the Shaw and Hope-Simpson commissions and the 
obligation to avert further crisis in Palestine, the solution to which appeared to defy 
some of their Party’s core values.  
As well as unstable levels of endorsement within his own party, MacDonald 
also had to contend with the inherent difficulties of minority governance; he relied on 
varying degrees of cross-party support for foreign policy initiatives to prevent 
polarised Parliamentary debates that risked splitting his own party.
30
 In March 1930, 
for example, MacDonald wrote to Passfield to arrange an early discussion on the 
necessity of a new Palestine policy, but stressing that ‘it could only be […] with the 
general support of all parties in the House of Commons’.31 Likewise, the prime 
minister’s son, Malcolm MacDonald, noted how it was always ‘important that the 
Liberals at any rate should support their proposals’.32 This was because Labour had 
inherited an Empire in disarray, and with the coming of a global depression, stronger 
dominions and colonial nationalisms, as well as the rise of the United States as a 
world power, imperial policy had become an exercise in calculated control through 
concession and compromise – a balance between firmness and conciliation – and 
these issues had the power to arouse great Parliamentary passions within as well as 
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across parties.
33
 Conservative Chairman Leopold Amery called this problem Labour’s 
‘paralysing ineptitude’.34 In this atmosphere, however, all party heads recognised the 
importance of some degree of cooperation in private negotiations.
35
 As such, 
MacDonald had conferred with both Conservative leader Stanley Baldwin and Liberal 
de facto leader David Lloyd George in March 1930 – specifically with regard to the 
Shaw Commission – to ask for ‘the guidance of your views on what should be done 
now’.36 This was necessary because the consequences of trying to move ahead 
without cross-party support had proved nearly disastrous for India policy the previous 
year, in circumstances highly similar to the debate that followed the Passfield White 
Paper.  
When Labour came to power in 1929, the existing legislation on India’s 
internal government was the Montagu-Chelmsford Act of 1921, which was due for 
review. To this end, a Statutory Commission chaired by Liberal MP Sir John Simon 
had been formed to recommend the next stages of constitutional development; in 
Parliament, passionate opinions regarding the degree and pace of Indian self-rule cut 
across parties. India had growing provincial nationalisms, and Lord Irwin, a 
Conservative peer cooperating with the government, suggested giving Indian 
politicians a veneer of responsibility and proto-independence to produce a sedative 
effect. Before the Simon Commission could present its report, however, the 
government issued the Irwin Declaration based on this principle on 31 Oct 1929. 
Whereas both Conservative and Liberal leaders had agreed to this cross-party 
initiative, the problem was with the declaration itself. Liberal Lord Reading, former 
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Viceroy to India, criticised the wording as dangerously ambiguous, sacrificing long-
term stability for short-term pacification. Reading’s stature commanded authority, and 
his objections allowed Lloyd George and other Liberals to refuse consent for the 
declaration, stiffening the instinctive opposition of Peel, Austen Chamberlain, 
Churchill and other Conservatives whom the Party leader, Stanley Baldwin, was 
unable to restrain once it became known that the declaration had not received Simon 
Commission approval. The result was a major hardening against minority-Labour’s 
India policy among both Conservatives and Liberals.
37
 The cabinet issued a 
communiqué specifically stating what Irwin’s ambiguity had attempted to conceal, 
that the declaration involved no change of policy, which sparked violent outrage in 
India and left bitter divisions between parties in Westminster.
38
  
In the year following the Irwin Declaration, however, there was a subtle and 
tenuous shift within Parliament back towards a more bipartisan line – Labour stood 
firmly behind the declaration, and despite a flurry of Liberal uncertainty, was 
ultimately supported by Lloyd George with Conservatives acting as a check on 
hurried constitutional development.
39
 India remained a crucial issue, however, and the 
cabinet was meeting twice a day in the summer of 1930 to discuss it. The situation 
remained tenuous for MacDonald, and Beatrice Webb (Lady Passfield) recorded in 
her diary during this time that ‘the Labour Government is on the rocks and may any 
day be wrecked’.40 The uneasy consensus on India policy built up the previous year 
was the product of luck rather than adroit political manoeuvring on the part of the 
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Labour government, which was fast approaching the first in a series of India Round 
Table Conferences in November 1930.  
The period 1929-30 marked one of the few occasions when India policy 
coloured all of British politics.
41
 Problems in India gradually became more pressing 
during 1930, and India became intricately intertwined with the issue of Party 
leadership battles.
42
 There was a general problem of ‘[d]iscontent and 
disillusionment’ along the front benches, which made the atmosphere even more 
volatile, and Labour leaders were ‘strangled by the multitudinous and complicated 
issues raised in government departments; and by the alarming gravity of two major 
problems – India’s upheaval and the continuous and increasing unemployment’, the 
latter of which was, of course, connected to India due to Britain’s crucial trading 
relationship with the Raj.
43
 This first Round Table Conference, therefore, was a bold 
procedural initiative designed to help MacDonald’s Labour government achieve one 
of their policy goals (granting India dominion status) despite the tense political 
environment. The conference was intended to create a direct dialogue between Indian 
and British politicians, representing all parties, thereby bypassing the India Office and 
minimising the risk of widespread revolt in the House of Commons.
44
 This was 
supposed to be a landmark moment, and it was directly threatened by the fallout from 
Passfield’s white paper. 
In addition, the conflict in Palestine bore some of the hallmarks British 
politicians associated with India, such as ethnic conflict and ‘natives’ agitating for 
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political rights: Leopold Amery remarked how the violence in Palestine would be 
‘familiar to most Indian administrators’.45 It would be a mistake, however, to consider 
that the two issues held equal weight in British politics: ‘little Palestine with its 
troubles – insignificant to the rest of the world’, Beatrice Webb wrote, ‘is likely to be 
forgotten in concern over the revolution which some say is going on in India’.46 
Palestine was, therefore, paradoxically, both important – because it threatened to 
disrupt Labour’s cross-party support for the India Round Table conference – and 
insignificant – as India was the chief and all-consuming concern. This India context 
meant that the government – and especially Passfield – were initially anxious to avoid 
any appearance of capitulation to outside pressure.  
At first, the government’s attitude of forbearance meant ignoring both the 
borderline anti-Semitic complaints of Palestine’s High Commissioner Sir John 
Chancellor as well as ‘the persistent bombardment by the Jews, in personal 
intercourse, in formal interviews, in newspaper propaganda, in insidious threats of 
ulterior action’. Passfield seemed to take great pride in resisting Zionist requests to lift 
a ban on immigration under the Labour schedule imposed by Chancellor with cabinet 
approval.
47
 Crucially, this attitude of steadfastness against the ‘Jewish hurricane’, as 
Passfield referred to it, endured during the new policy’s preparation in cabinet 
committees in the summer of 1930 and obviously did not prevent its publication on 21 
October. Weizmann, for example, threatened to resign on 13 October but the white 
paper was still published two weeks later. In contrast, the political danger following 
publication of the Passfield White Paper emanated chiefly from within the British 
political establishment, and stemmed from many criticisms levelled at the white paper 
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that represented more political strategy than principled objection.
48
 Accusations 
directed by Liberal and Conservative leaders against the Labour government were not 
overly concerned with the text of the white paper or the policy it contained. They did, 
however, prolong the debate that was potentially divisive to Labour’s own ranks, 
which fundamentally altered the government’s priorities when negotiations with 
Zionists began in earnest following the Parliamentary debate on Palestine in mid-
November. 
 
During the short time period in which the Passfield White Paper came under fire in 
Westminster, all three parties: Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberals were 
suffering through leadership problems. As the Palestine issue was applicable to many 
Conservative MPs’ ideas regarding India, it was a subject on which Baldwin could 
score easy points among his colleagues. David Lloyd George was leader of the 
Liberals in all but name and faced an increasingly marginalised position, a potential 
rival in Sir John Simon and the need to defend his own prime ministerial record. Both 
Baldwin – through Leopold Amery – and David Lloyd George had previous ties to 
Zionism and prior relationships with Chaim Weizmann, but the Passfield White Paper 
was also an easy and expedient target for both opposition leaders in a campaign 
waged through their letters to The Times and speeches during the subsequent 
Parliamentary debate on Palestine. 
It is important to note that Stanley Baldwin had barely survived the Irwin 
Declaration debacle by appeasing his vocal critics within the Conservative Party. 
When Baldwin spoke in Parliament on the India issue, for example, ‘there had been 
no word of approval from his own colleagues and as soon as Lloyd George got up 
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Winston and Worthington-Evans on each side of him leant forward and punctuated 
every sentence with emphatic ‘hear hears!”’ The Conservative leader was in danger of 
having to resign because ‘[i]f the matter had gone to division half his colleagues 
would have voted against him’.49 A moderate facing ‘diehard’ backbench opinion, 
especially with regard to India, the Conservative leader could ill afford to support any 
government policy that appeared to acquiesce in the face of demands even remotely 
similar to those of the India Congress. In the case of Palestine, Leopold Amery noted 
how Arabs were comparable to Indians – not because British politicians viewed Jews 
as non-indigenous, but because they were Caucasian, European, and therefore 
perceived very differently.
50
 Approaching the India Round Table in 1930, Baldwin 
deliberately retreated from frontline politics and declined to serve on Britain’s 
delegation to the conference.
51
 He wrote to Lord Irwin on 16 October to say that in 
preparing for the conference, he ‘kept off, partly to keep L.l.G. off and partly because 
the political situation is far too tricky to allow me to be immersed in a Conference 
when every crook in the country is out for my scalp’.52  
In this environment, Leopold Amery, the Conservative Party Chairman, 
former Colonial Secretary and known Zionist sympathiser, strove to keep Baldwin in 
his leadership position.
53
 Amery was indeed a Zionist, but he was first and foremost a 
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British imperialist. This is evident in an article he wrote for The Pioneer in December 
1929: ‘The terms of the Balfour Declaration make it plain that the creation of the 
Jewish National Home did not imply the setting up of a Jewish nationalist state’, he 
wrote, ‘[e]qually it left no room, in Palestine at least, for the assertion of that type of 
nationalism by the Arabs’.54 Even with Amery’s confidence, which was not 
unconditional and wavered substantially the following year, Baldwin felt the 
opposition of diehards as well as members of the Conservative Party who still 
favoured coalition with Lloyd George and had been marginalised by his removal in 
1922, such as Austen Chamberlain. The policy that joined many along the Liberal and 
Conservative benches was free trade within the Empire, which was the particular 
cause of press barons, Lord Beaverbrook and Lord Rothermere, who formed the 
United Empire Party to split the Conservative vote and pressure against India 
reform.
55
  
This alignment of interests aroused suspicions of collaboration between the 
three men. Baldwin, for example, asked his shadow cabinet, ‘[w]hat is your reading of 
the Beaverbrook-Rothermere game? And under which thimble is the pea, or in other 
words Ll.G.?’56 In a moment of frustration in dealing with this situation, Amery 
suggested the Baldwin-loyalists should sign a letter to their leader saying ‘All your 
old colleagues conscious of each other’s senility desire to tell you that not one of them 
has any objection to any of the others being bumped off […]’.57 While assassinating 
the diehard Conservatives was not an option, their various outrages were at least 
relatively predictable. Baldwin and Amery were determined to beat these internal 
                                                 
54
 AMEL 1/5/46, 1 of 2, December 1929, ‘The Future in Palestine’ The Pioneer, CAC, 5-6. 
55
 S. Ball, ‘The Legacy of Coalition: Fear and Loathing in Conservative Politics, 1922–1931’ 
Contemporary British History, 25, 1 (March 2011), 65-82, 77; Williamson, Baldwin Papers, 225-232. 
56
 Amery Diaries, II, 59-60 (30 January 1930) in Williamson, Baldwin Papers, 226. 
57
 Baldwin to Davidson, 13 November 1930, Lady Davidson Papers, partly in Davidson Memoirs, 355, 
in Williamson, Baldwin Papers, 246. 
 18 
opponents at their own game: ‘I am fighting with beasts at Ephesus’, Baldwin wrote, 
‘and I hope to see their teeth drawn and their claws broken before the battle is over!’58  
These fears and frustrations aligned with Amery’s long-term involvement with 
Zionism and culminated in a letter to The Times protesting against the Passfield White 
Paper. The letter was constructed in conjunction with Arthur Balfour’s niece and 
Zionist campaigner Baffy Dugdale. Amery recounted how ‘Mrs Dugdale […] came in 
very much concerned about the Palestine White Paper’ and believed that the 
Conservative Party should ‘dissociate themselves as promptly as possible from the 
Government in this matter’. Amery agreed and ushered Mrs Dugdale in to see Stanley 
Baldwin, inviting her to begin ‘drafting something before she came back and lunched 
with us’. Mrs Dugdale then took Baldwin’s ‘general instructions as to the points to be 
brought out in a letter’, which she drafted and then Amery revised and amended the 
document with Baldwin and Austen Chamberlain.
59
 Weizmann credited his colleague 
Namier with inspiring Mrs Dugdale, but it was Leopold Amery who organised the 
Conservative opposition to the white paper.
60
  
Amery even recruited Austen Chamberlain for this purpose. As well as a 
known Zionist sympathiser, Chamberlain had opposed Baldwin over the Irwin 
Declaration and had no confidence in him as a leader, noting how, ‘to recall an old 
cartoon of “Punch”, a manifesto in his hands becomes “a wet blanket”’. Chamberlain, 
however, did not relish the thought of a party run by the press barons and opposed 
attempts to force Baldwin’s resignation on the grounds that it ‘would be hailed as a 
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triumph for themselves by Rothermere and Beaverbrook’.61 Published on the 23 
October 1930, their collaborative letter accused the Labour government of 
abandoning the Jewish national home policy, stating, ‘they have laid down a policy of 
so definitely negative a character that it appears to us to conflict […] with the whole 
spirit of the Balfour Declaration and of the statements made by successive 
Governments in the last 12 years’. The effect of this policy, the letter charged, was ‘to 
create a feeling of distrust in that British good faith which is the most precious asset 
of our foreign Imperial policy’.62 The letter was relatively brief, and as such made no 
reference to the Shaw or Hope-Simpson Commissions nor to any of the specific 
arguments utilised by the white paper. 
Baldwin was not a passive observer in this political infighting, but he found it 
very draining and sympathised with James Ramsay MacDonald’s similar situation, 
seeing the Prime Minister as ‘a good man and true, fighting for his life’.63 The same 
was not true for Baldwin’s opinions of David Lloyd George: ‘no constitution can 
stand public life today when you get near seventy’, Baldwin wrote, ‘unless you are 
made like L.l.G. with no bowels, no principles, no heart and no friends’.64 The Liberal 
leader was, however, also under pressure from his own party. While Amery did not 
necessarily want a Parliamentary debate on the Palestine white paper, ‘fearing that it 
would show divisions in our own ranks’, it was David Lloyd George who recognised 
the opportunity, pushed for a date and organised a debate.
65
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By 1930, Lloyd George’s unofficial position as leader of the Liberal Party was 
also tenuous. He had been a divisive figure for Liberal politics since 1916 when he 
ousted Prime Minister Asquith and then fronted a majority Conservative government 
against the wishes of many within his party. In July 1930, Lloyd George had led a 
vote against the government and lost simply because many Liberal MPs defied the 
whip and sided against their leader.
66
 Lloyd George was also bitterly frustrated with 
the Liberal Party’s marginalised position and support for a Socialist government that 
was failing to fulfil its promise of radical reform. As MacDonald refused to supply an 
arrangement that gave the dwindling Liberal Party any lifeline, Lloyd George 
attempted to exploit Conservative dissatisfaction with Baldwin to win back some of 
his former coalitionists and attract younger, more progressive Tories into his sphere.
67
 
Baldwin recognised the tactic, noting that, ‘The Goat has finally failed to get any real 
arrangements with Labour and rumour has it he is going to make another attempt on 
us’.68  
Lloyd George was also close to a leadership challenge from Sir John Simon, 
of the Simon Commission in India.
69
 As head of a majority Conservative coalition 
between 1918 and 1922, Lloyd George had lent broad support to Zionism, and 
whenever the subject surfaced in debate he advocated the movement with a vociferous 
sincerity that also served to defend his own prime ministerial tenure. This meant that 
the letter Simon wrote to The Times with Conservative politician Lord Hailsham was 
also a tacit challenge to the Liberal leader’s position. The letter purported to compare 
provisions of the white paper to the terms of the mandate and accused the government 
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of flouting Britain’s international obligations as a member and trustee of the League 
of Nations. Furthermore, it called for ‘the Council of the League of Nations to obtain 
from The Hague Court an advisory opinion on the questions involved’.70 Like with 
the Irwin Declaration, however, such criticism of the Passfield White Paper was not 
concerned with the actual policy, but instead, ‘[a]lleged ambiguities and 
unfriendliness’, how it looked and sounded.71 This was the political context in which 
the Passfield White Paper was published on 21 October 1930 and then debated in the 
House of Commons on 17 November. 
Comprised of targeted attacks from Liberal and Conservative MPs designed to 
embarrass the government rather than clarify points of policy, the debate was centred 
on issues like antisemitism and breaches of faith. The government’s response, 
however, had been prepared in advance by the Colonial Office and so was directed 
against the substance of these complaints rather than their political motivations. This 
led to a situation in which the substance of the white paper was immaterial to its 
survival. Speaking first, Lloyd George led the attack, accusing the government of 
antisemitism and hypocrisy, and he attempted to drive a wedge between MacDonald 
and the Colonial Secretary by questioning ‘whether the Prime Minister himself was 
fully consulted before this document was issued’. MacDonald never answered these 
comments, but of course he had approved the policy.
72
 Palestine High Commissioner 
Sir John Chancellor’s comments on this debate were as blunt as ever: ‘L.G’.s speech 
was typical – all sentiment and hot air’.73  
In response to these attacks, it was Colonial Office Under-Secretary Shiels’ 
task to speak in defence of the government, which in principle was not difficult. 
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Shiels highlighted how ‘[t]here seems to have been some obvious 
misunderstanding’74, but he was merely being polite. The protests from Liberals and 
Conservatives in The Times had already been identified as both fallacious and 
underhanded. Chancellor openly expressed this opinion, writing to O.G.R. Williams 
directly at the Colonial Office to say he was ‘greatly concerned about the letter which 
Baldwin, Chamberlain and Amery have written to the Times. If all parties would 
accept H.M.G’.s statement of policy, there would be some prospect of future peace in 
Palestine. If they are going to make it a party question, Palestine will become a 
running sore and a potential danger to the safety of the Empire, like Ireland’.75 In 
correspondence with Shuckburgh in the Colonial Office’s Middle East Department, 
Chancellor added, ‘I share your view as to the mischievous character of the Baldwin-
Chamberlain-Amery letter. No doubt it was inspired by Amery’.76 After both letters 
had been published, the Colonial Office prepared a defence of the white paper, and 
their memoranda formed the basis of Shiels’ defence.  
At the Colonial Office, O.G.R. Williams was responsible for the full rebuttal 
to Hailsham and Simon’s letter. Williams noted that the letter purported to compare 
the white paper with the official mandate, but mentioned only the mandate’s 
preamble, Article II and Article VI, omitting any reference to protecting non-Jewish 
populations. As well as misleadingly paraphrasing the white paper, Hailsham and 
Simon also ignored the findings of Hope-Simpson and created an impression of the 
new policy that was ‘quite untrue’. Williams did highlight, however, how Hailsham 
and Simon’s reference to The Hague was purely political since ‘it would be so framed 
as to be exceedingly unfavourable and humiliating to His Majesty’s Government […] 
owing to the peculiar composition of The Hague Court’. This was the only part of the 
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letter that was troubling, not because the issue really would necessitate referral to The 
Hague, but because dealing with it exposed the government’s financial motivations 
for cutting Jewish immigration rather than investing in development.
77
  
Otherwise, arguments opposing the white paper prompted only incredulity at 
the Colonial Office. Passfield himself was wrote a rebuttal to The Times, stating ‘[i]t 
is reassuring to find from their letter published in your columns […] that such high 
authorities as Lord Hailsham and Sir John Simon do not indicate anything in the 
Palestine White Paper inconsistent with the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate save 
in so far as they seek to draw from language used in paragraphs 15, 19 to 23 and 28 
three inferences, not one of which is justified’. These inferences, Passfield added, ‘are 
made plausible only by an inaccurate representation of the contents of the paragraphs 
referred to, not one of which is quoted verbatim’.78 The usually competitive Foreign 
and Colonial Offices were also in complete agreement.  
Foreign Secretary Henderson had received the full text of Zionist objections to 
the white paper a week before the debate (via the Prime Minister’s pro-Zionist son, 
Malcolm MacDonald). The eastern dept of the Foreign Office had then prepared a full 
rebuttal that raised almost identical points to the defence written by the Colonial 
Office without conferring between the two. Both ministries agreed that there was ‘no 
intention to crystallise the status quo’.79 High Commissioner Chancellor echoed the 
absurdity of this situation, noting that ‘[t]he local Jewish criticisms of the statement of 
policy, for the most part, condemn it for things that it does not contain’. In Parliament, 
Shiels reiterated polite versions of these sentiments and stressed his earlier opinion 
                                                 
77
 CO 733/182/8, 4 November 1930, Memorandum by Williams, TNA; CO 733/183/3, 21 November 
1930, ‘Memorandum on the Policy of His Majesty’s Government as Set out in the October White 
Paper’, TNA. 
78
 CO 733/182/8, 5 November 1930, Draft Letter, Passfield to The Times, TNA. 
79
 FO 800/282, 14 November 1930, ‘Notes on Jewish statement communicated by Mr Malcolm 
Macdonald’, TNA. 
 24 
that the ‘White Paper makes no change whatever in the interpretation of the Mandate’, 
but rather, ‘[w]hat it does is to emphasize the necessity for a more exact application of 
the absorptive capacity principle’.80  Therefore, Shiels argued, ‘[i]t is obvious that the 
suggestion that this Government is seeking to crystallise the Jewish National Home in 
its present position is without a shadow of foundation’. The bureaucracy was united; 
differences of opinion on the Passfield White Paper were between politicians. 
During the Parliamentary debate, it was Leopold Amery who brought up the 
subject of India. Amery declared that Palestine’s 1929 riots were ‘an old-fashioned 
religious outbreak of the type with which the Indian administration is only too 
familiar’. He was trying to draw a comparison between ‘giving in’ to Arabs in 
Palestine and acquiescing to Indian self-rule, hinting at the Irwin Declaration. ‘This is 
not the first White Paper of this kind that has appeared’, Amery declared, and pointed 
to unrest throughout the world ‘because of the White Papers which are poured out 
from the Colonial Office and which we are afterwards told do not mean what they 
appear to say’. Amery’s speech was aimed at the diehard, anti-Baldwin group within 
the Conservative Party. This is why the arguments against the white paper had little 
bearing on the document’s actual contents.  
As expected, condemnation and support was not unanimous among any party. 
Colonel Charles Howard-Bury, for example, was Conservative MP for Chelmsford 
and believed the government had ‘acted very courageously and impartially in 
producing that White Paper’. Another Conservative MP, Sir George Jones, 
admonished the character of the debate, stating ‘that it would be a calamity if the 
Palestinian question were involved in party politics in this country’. The Liberal MP 
Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris defied his own leader by highlighting how ‘it would be a 
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moment of very grave importance in the history of this country if it were recognised 
that international events of this kind are to be part of the ordinary battle of party 
conflict in this country’. Labour MP Frederick Cocks also called attention to the 
political machinations underway, saying Lloyd George ‘had one eye on the Mount of 
Olives and the other on a part of the East End of London where a by-election is about 
to take place and where there is a population of very hard-working and able Zionists’. 
Other Labour members lent support to the Opposition. Daniel Hopkin, for example, 
raised the spectre of anti-Semitism.
81
 Although both Liberal and Conservative parties 
were relatively untroubled by backbench dissent in this debate, Labour could not 
afford such breaking of ranks. Amery understood this and gave his assessment of the 
debate as ‘From White Paper to white sheet’.82 Beatrice Webb recognised, however, 
that ‘all three parties are in a devil of a mess’.83 
Although Anglo-Zionist discussions regarding the Passfield White Paper 
began the day of this Parliamentary debate and were intended as a means to clarify the 
new Palestine policy, these negotiations only gradually witnessed the policy’s 
reversal. Rather than Chaim Weizmann’s skilful lobbying, these talks reveal a Labour 
government emphatically defending its new policy before wearily tossing it aside as 
the issue threatened to bleed into another busy and stressful calendar year. 
When the white paper was published on 21 October 1930, the criticism it 
attracted seemed to impact Prime Minister MacDonald’s thinking relatively quickly. 
On 6 November, the cabinet decided to create a new sub-committee for Palestine 
policy. The new committee was tasked with legal clarification of Palestine policy in 
cooperation with an authority such as the Lord Advocate, and it would also ‘get in 
touch with the representatives of the Zionists in the most politic and tactful manner 
                                                 
81
 House of Commons Debates, 17 November 1930, vol 245, cols 96–187. 
82
 Barnes and Nicholson, The Empire at Bay, 90. 
83
 PASSFIELD/1/2/9, 11 July 1930, Diary of Beatrice Webb, LSE. 
 26 
possible in the circumstances and should make recommendations as to the attitude to 
be taken up by the Government in view of the reception of the recently issued white 
paper’.84 MacDonald then met with Weizmann the same day, when he reportedly told 
the Zionist leader, ‘There is no white paper’.85 This unequivocal comment was most 
likely an off-the-record exclamation and there is little other indication that the 
decision to reverse the white paper had been made by 6 November. Bringing the 
Zionists into discussions, however, was likely influenced by the Hailsham and Simon 
letter since the sub-committee was tasked with ensuring the new policy was legal and 
sound. This is why the cabinet wanted ‘clarification’ conducted in conjunction with 
the Lord Advocate.
86
 Gestation of the reversal idea had only just begun, and the 
government would have been unlikely to proceed with a difficult Commons debate 
and an impassioned defence of the white paper had the decision to reverse it already 
been made. Rather, the main issue remained correcting any appearance that Labour 
intended to undermine international law.
87
  
Henderson’s notes for the negotiations demonstrate his confidence in the 
government’s stance. ‘If ‘the position’ of the Arabs is ‘positively changed for the 
worse’’, Henderson wrote, ‘the Government must take steps to put things right’.  
Zionist criticisms, he decided, ‘lose a good deal of their force because they assume 
intentions on the part of His Majesty’s Government which are contrary to the facts’. 
The Foreign Secretary was also annoyed by Zionist memoranda’ prolific citations of 
Hailsham and Simon’s letter to The Times without a single reference to Lord 
Passfield’s rebuttal of 5 November and frequent misleading quotations. An oft-
repeated accusation that the white paper blamed Arab unemployment solely on Jewish 
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immigration, for example, was one instance ‘of incomplete quotation and 
misinterpretation of the white paper’. As it was not the British government’s priority 
to establish a Jewish state, it was, Henderson believed, its duty to issue the white 
paper. It is important to preface these opinions, however, with the knowledge that 
Henderson entered into these Anglo-Zionist talks with an eye on the League of 
Nations where his top priority throughout the autumn of 1930 was disarmament. The 
Foreign Secretary was wary of Zionism’s international activities. ‘On the publication 
of the Shaw Report’, he wrote, ‘there is reason to suppose that every effort was made 
by the Jews to influence the Permanent Mandates Commission unfavourably against 
His Majesty’s Government’. Another member of the Foreign Office later scribbled an 
additional note: ‘though it must be admitted that there is no documentary or other 
proof’.88 
The Palestine subcommittee first met Zionist representatives on 17 November 
and the initiation of these talks was announced that day. It was hoped that the 
beginning of the subcommittee’s discussions would provide some inoculation against 
criticisms anticipated at the debate, but Shiels was unconvinced. ‘I am rather doubtful 
about the electoral help we shall get’, he wrote to Henderson, ‘as Amery, L.l.G. and 
Co. are heavily in with Weizmann […]’.89 What followed was a series of face-to-face 
meetings and negotiations via correspondence until late January 1931. Throughout 
these talks, Chaim Weizmann alternated between confidence in his ability to secure a 
reversal of the white paper and uncertainty regarding the direction of negotiations. 
Two days after the debate, for example, Weizmann informed Amery that ‘[a]lthough 
the Government is retreating very slowly and with not too much grace, a retreat it is’. 
However, a few days later Weizmann wrote that, ‘I do not know how our negotiations 
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will end. This is no easy matter’. Weizmann received the first draft of what became 
the MacDonald Letter on 29 November, and he remarked that the ‘impression here is 
unfavourable’.90  
This first attempt, labelled ‘the Henderson letter’ at this stage, was very long 
and essentially constituted the full rebuttals already made by Passfield, Shiels, the 
Colonial and Foreign Offices. It did contain some of the key reversing phrases found 
in the final letter, but these were accompanied by extensive contextual caveats. While 
noting that the Passfield White Paper made land control ‘regulatory and not 
prohibitive’ the first draft also went on to say, ‘it does involve a power to veto 
transactions which are inconsistent with the tenor of the general scheme’. As well as 
assurances there would be no stoppage of immigration in any category, the first draft 
included sprawling provisos asserting the government’s right to restrict immigration 
in line with economic capacity.
91
  
Weizmann considered that Passfield was poisoning the atmosphere against 
them, believing ‘the old man malignantly sabotages everything’.92 From the Zionist 
delegation’s perspective, the problem was that Henderson and two other committee 
members had no prior dealings with their cause, creating long, drawn-out meetings in 
which the intricacies had to be explained and the busy Henderson in particular 
became very irritable. In contrast, Weizmann wrote, ‘Passfield does know the thing, 
but he is so artful and shifty that you never know when you have got him to agree to 
something’.93 Looking at the meeting transcripts and Henderson’s notes, however, he 
was well versed with the problems of Palestine and simply refused to yield on the 
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government’s right to issue the white paper and his belief that Zionist criticisms were 
unfounded. Henderson told Weizmann he was being ‘supersensitive’, and quoted 
Shiels’ Parliamentary defence of the white paper during meetings. The Foreign 
Secretary challenged Weizmann on every point, demonstrating how these talks were 
originally intended to persuade and intimidate rather than placate Weizmann and his 
fellow Zionists. ‘[O]ur whole object’, Henderson stated, is ‘to clear up matters that are 
ambiguous, that have been misstated or misunderstood […] I want you and your 
colleagues to be quite clear in your mind that the fullest possible opportunity is given 
to you to state every possible objection your people have to this White Paper. You can 
expect nothing more’.94  
By mid-December, Weizmann complained that ‘[t]he negotiations with the 
Government drag on rather inconclusively’.95 A redraft of the Henderson letter 
returned from a legal committee but included only minor technical changes to 
language in two paragraphs of a document more than twenty pages long.
96
 There was 
still no agreement by the end of December, but Weizmann met the Prime Minister on 
Christmas Eve and believed he ‘seems really anxious that our negotiations should end 
in a successful agreement’.97 This was likely because the Whitechapel By-Election of 
3 December showed a significantly reduced Labour majority.   
Meanwhile, the Palestine subcommittee was achieving very little, and 
Henderson was due to leave London for Geneva on 9 January. In preparation for his 
absence, the Foreign Secretary authorised another redraft of the letter. This was 
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written by the Lord Advocate and Malcolm MacDonald, both identified by Weizmann 
as friends of their cause – and finished on 7 January, resulting in a fourth draft of the 
letter.
98
 It was during these January meetings that the final letter took shape by 
eliminating all of the caveats and provisos concerning Britain’s right to limit Jewish 
immigration and land purchase that Henderson had defended since November. Further 
changes were agreed via written correspondence on 22 January 1931, but they were 
superficial – all offending wording had already been removed from the British draft.99 
There was a final meeting between Zionists and the Palestine sub-committee on 30 
January and suddenly they had complete agreement. The fifth draft of the letter was 
finalised during this session and was approved by cabinet on 4 February 1931.
100
 
 
The reversal of the Passfield White Paper did not occur, therefore, until January 1931 
and evolved relatively quickly during that month as the Palestine sub-committee, and 
particularly Henderson, stopped defending the government’s original position. This 
process seems to have constituted a rather hurried attempt to rid the Labour 
government of a problem leftover from the previous year when other more important 
issues continued to demand attention. On 23 January, for example, the Prime Minister 
officially closed the first stage of the India Conference, which was due to continue 
within a few months. In the House of Commons, the Conservative spokesman made it 
clear that they intended to preserve cross-party unity on India, not least to avoid 
creating another dangerously partisan issue arising like the question of Ireland.
101
 The 
implications were simply too important for Britain and the Empire more broadly. 
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Indeed, Palestine could be tidied away, Beatrice Webb wrote, but  ‘[d]uring 
the next year, whichever party is in power, it is India that will claim attention’.102 It 
appears that the weight of holding the Labour Party together on an issue made more 
divisive by the arguments of Conservative and Liberal politicians, who were partially 
motivated by preserving their own leadership positions, was simply too tiresome. The 
minority Labour government found it less aggravating to concede to the terms of a 
letter drafted and amended by the Prime Minister’s own son and a legal authority in 
the Lord Advocate than to continue to defend the Passfield White Paper against what 
both the Foreign Office and Colonial Offices agreed were unfounded accusations. 
There may have been no official alliance between Chaim Weizmann, Baldwin, Amery 
and Lloyd George, but the effect on MacDonald and his colleagues was the same.
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In a bid to maintain Labour unity and avoid derailing India policy, the government 
most likely found itself resigned to jettisoning the Passfield White Paper.  
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